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Abstract 
 This paper aims at exploring the political economy of Balochistan 
and the underlying causes of social and economic development of the 
province. The paper presents a brief and critical account on the historical 
development of the Baloch nation and nationhood. The paper argues that 
The Baloch notwithstanding having a huge and resourceful land has failed 
to keep the pace of socio-economic development and modernity with other 
fellow nations in the region. After the independence of Pakistan and the 
formation of Balochistan as a province of Pakistan, the Baloch because of 
her political disorganization and economic backwardness failed to exert 
herself within the federation to grab the resource share. The story of 
economic and social backwardness of the Baloch and Balochistan is a 
multifaceted puzzle. A section of the Baloch nationalists believe that the 
centralist nature of Pakistani federation is such that small nationalities like 
the Baloch would find it hard to accommodate within the federation. That is 
because, the resource distribution and representation to both elected bodies 
and state institutions are based upon population, and Balochistan in spite of 
having 44% of Pakistan territory accommodates only 5% of country’s total 
population. The paper also touches the geostrategic importance of 
Balochistan and underlines its economic difficulty in terms of the dearth of 
human resources, physical infrastructure, economic autonomy, productivity 
among others. 
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Introduction 
 Balochistan, a federating unit of Pakistan, had remained a semi-
autonomous state and a loss confederacy in pre-partition of the Sub-
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Continent and before the the independence of Pakistan (Harrison, 1981; 
Bansal, 2006). Balochistan with immense geo-strategic importance and huge 
untapped natural resource reserves (oil, gas, gold, copper and others), retains 
44% of total territory of Pakistan. At the eve of Independence of 
Subcontinent and the subsequent creation of Pakistan and India as two 
independent courtiers, Balochistan, formerly a princely state under the 
British Raj, opted to annex with Pakistan in 194834. The conflict between the 
province and the federation of Pakistan has been amongst the persistent 
state-province contradictions in recent history of counties (Aasim, 2007). 
The Baloch – the inhabitants of Balochistan – revolted five times against the 
federation for more political and economic rights (see Harrison, 1981 and 
Breseeg, 2004). In order to suppress the insurgency, the state used force and 
applied other means that normally be used by any state to subdue the 
insurgency35.  
  Why the Balochistan-Pakistan relation has been estranged and why 
the former has been failed to incorporate the latter into the federation and 
maintained a cordial relationship? Furthermore, it is important to know that 
in spite of having huge resources and endowments Balochistan has remained 
the poorest and economically the least-developed region in Pakistan.  
Notwithstanding  the economic potentials and massive strategic importance, 
Balochistan is not only presents the picture of extreme poverty, 
backwardness, and lagging far behind other provinces in terms of every 
social and economic indicators, it has gripped in the vicious circle of 
nationalist insurgency, and ethnic and sectarian violence. 
 To explore such compelling questions one needs to be aware of 
Balochistan’s relations with the federation of Pakistan in a historical context 
and analyse the underlining causes of underdevelopment of Balochistan by 
describing the political economy of the province. This paper is an attempt to 
provide answers to these questions. 
 
Baloch and Balochistan: a Brief History  
 The Baloch is one of the oldest nations of Iranian plateau. For 
historians it has not been easy to locate Baloch history due mainly to the 
unavailability of documentary evidences. The only solution left to the 
researchers to trace out the origin of the Baloch is to study the cultural and 
linguistic affiliation of the Baloch with other ethnic groups within the region. 
The first plausible and somewhat comprehensive work on Baloch history and 
                                                          
34 The opinion is divided on the question that whether Balochistan joined the federation of 
Pakistan willingly or it was compelled to do so forcefully. For details on this issue see 
Ahmed, 1975. 
35 However, in case of Pakistan and the province of Balochistan, human rights violations 
have been recorded (see Human Rights of Commission of Pakistan Report, 2014). 
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language was carried out by Dames (1904) who traced the origin of the 
Baloch to Kerman (in present day Iran). 
 In later part of the 20th century, after the work of many researchers on 
Iranian languages, the Balochi language has now established as a member of 
north-western group of Iranian languages (Jahani, 2003). Along with Persian, 
Balochi, Zazaki Kurdish, Talyshi, Mazandarani and Gilaki are main 
languages of this group (Axenov, 2006). On cultural ground, Bosworth 
(1977) and Janmahmad (1982) consider that the Baloch have much similarity 
and resemblance with Parthian and Medes. Moreover, cultural, linguistic and 
traditional evidence indicate that the Baloch are closely related to the Median 
group of tribes among which Kurds are the most prominent member. 
However, Dasthi (2012) maintains that the Baloch have remained a 
distinctive ethnic group possessed their own territorial independence and the 
language since late antiquity while living in alliance with other nationalities 
and ethnic groups and sharing cultural and linguistic features with them.  
 The Baloch has always lived in tribal communities with frequent 
movement from one part of their inhabited territory to another without 
having a proper chain of command. Nonetheless, a significant change took 
place in Baloch history in the 14th century when Mir Chakar Khan Rind 
established the first tribal confederacy of the Baloch tribes to unite them 
under one loose administrative structure.  His tribal confederacy stretched 
from Kirman to the west, Afghanistan to northeast, Sindh and Punjab up to 
the southeast and Arabian Sea to the south (Fred, 2002). Chakar Khan’s step 
towards the Baloch unification was the first cogent initiative. However, after 
his demise the tribes failed to maintain their political unity until 1666 when 
the first Kalat confederacy was established. The Kalat confederacy was 
larger and more coherent than Ckakar Khan’s confederation. In early 18th 
century the Kalat confederacy encompassed an area from Kandahar 
(Afghanistan) to the north and Bandar Abbas (Iran) to the west. To the east it 
extended to Dera Ghazi Khan and Karachi to the southeast (Ali, 2005). 
Under the 6th Khan of Kalat, Mir Naseer Khan, the Kalat confederacy 
emerged as a strong confederation with a regular army of some 25,000 
manpower, a bureaucratic setup and two legislative councils (the house of 
lords and house of commons) (Harrison, 1981). During his rule significant 
improvements took place in terms of physical and economic infrastructure. 
He constructed roads, ports and encouraged education and learning. The 
territory under Kalat confederacy achieved the highest of development and 
attained the architectural, cultural and economic climax (Fred, 2002). Thus 
with organised army and administrative structure Kalat remained somewhat 
a sovereign state under the shadow of Afghanistan rulers until the arrival of 
British, who entered into Balochistan with high imperial designs. The Kalat 
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confederacy lasted until when British Army entered in Balochistan On 13th 
November 1839 (Breseeg, 2004:159-166).  
 There are two distinctive views concerning relations between the 
British and Khanate Kalat. One is that the relations were based on amity, 
through agreements and treaties, but the other view is that there was a forced 
subjugation of the Kalat State by the British. The treaties with the State of 
Kalat and the revolts of Baloch tribes illustrate both these viewpoints. Zaidi 
(1993:288) argues in the Jinnah papers that “the history of British relations 
with the Kalat State and its rulers been one of the friendly alliances and 
treaties of mutual friendship and amity throughout”. After the occupation of 
the state of Kalat by the British they finally signed a treaty and recognised 
Nasir Khan II as the ruler of Kalat in 1841. This treaty mentions that the 
“British troops could be stationed in Kalat territory” (Breseeg, 2005: 160). 
Various other treaties were signed at different times which provided an 
opportunity for the British to station their forces on British Balochistan 
territory en route to Afghanistan. In return for these concessions Kalat would 
receive handsome of subsidies and guarantees of tribal autonomy (Harrison, 
1981). Of all the treaties and agreements signed, the Treaty of 1876 was the 
most important one.  
 It had become expedient to sign treaty of 1876 in order to renew and 
reinforce the old treaty of 1854 and “to supplement the same by certain 
additional provisions calculated to draw closer the bond of friendship and 
amity between the two governments” (Zaidi, 1993:288). Article 3 of this 
treaty states that “the British Government to respect the Independence of 
Kalat” (Zaidi, 1993:288).36 
 In early 20th century, Baloch middle class begun to mobilise a 
political struggle. They established the Anjuman-e Ithad-e-Balochistan (the 
Association for the Unity of Balochistan), which was a political party and a 
social organisation. Its principal aims, according to Bugti (1996) and Nasir 
(2010) and Baloch (1987) were; 1) ending the colonisation of Balochistan 
from the British; 2) unifying Balochistan; 3) the abolition of the Sardari 
system in Balochistan; and 4) establishing an independent united 
Balochistan. Later on in 1931 the Kalat State National Party was formed 
after the Persian occupation of Western Balochistan in 1928.37 The Anjuman-
                                                          
36 Many of the Baloch believe that Kalat State enjoyed an independent status under the 
treaty of 1876 and the British became responsible for protecting Kalat State’s independent 
status.  
37 The Persian states weakened, and western Balochistan broke away once in the first decade 
of the 20th century. Bahram Khan (a Baloch ruler) extended his authority over most of the 
central and southern region of western Balochistan in 1915 (Bugti, 1996).  Iran annexed 
western Balochistan to Persia once again in 1928 and this region is currently known as 
Seistan-Balochistan (Breseeg 2004: 195-96). It has since 1928 been part of Iran. 
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e-Ithad-e-Balochistan and Kalat State National Party (KSNP) were secular in 
nature and orientation, and sought a unified democratic Balochistan 
(Redaelli, 1997). Both parties have provided a social and political platform 
for the Baloch youth to work for the Baloch people and uplift them 
economically and socially.   
 The decade of 1930 was a crucial period for Balochistan, when the 
British were planning to leave and divide India. As the prospect of 
independence from British approached, the Khan and the other Baloch 
leaders had to decide on the future status of Balochistan (Harrison, 1981). 
Unlike other states, Kalat along with Nepal maintained its treaty relations 
directly with British crown in Whitehall. Moreover, under the 1876 
agreement through which the British were allowed to operate in Balochistan 
pledged that the former would not violate the sovereignty of the latter 
(Ahmed, 1975).  On the eve of British withdrawal from the Indian Sub-
Continent, the Khan declared the previous status of Kalat State on 12th 
August 1947, two days before the creation of Pakistan (Dashti, 2012).  
 The Government of Kalat State Act 1947 was promulgated as the 
new constitution of Balochistan. Under the constitution Balochistan would 
establish a representative system of governance with aiming to connect the 
people of Balochistan with administration and other state machinery of Kalat 
(Talbot, 1998). The legislature was composed of two houses: the Upper 
House and the Lower House. Under the Act, shortly after the independence 
elections were held for both the houses. KNSP won the majority seats in the 
House of Commons.  
 Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founding father of 
Pakistan and the first governor general, began to persuade the Khan to merge 
the territory of Balochistan with Pakistan. And subsequently given the 
geographical proximity, Muslim majority population, and other social, 
cultural and economic matters, the Khan willfully agreed to make a part it a 
province of Pakistan. However, Naseer (1979) argues that after the 
withdrawal of British from India, and the subsequent inception of Pakistan 
and India as two independent countries, the issue of Balochistan’s merger 
with the state of Pakistan was not as smooth as it was understood. When the 
state of Kalat initially was adamant to become a part of newly independent 
country, Pakistan directly approached sub-ordinate states of Makuran, 
Kharan and Lasbela to join the country bypassing the state of Kalat. 
Consequently Pakistan has been successful in splitting the Baloch state. 
Eventually the Khan succumbed to the pressures of Pakistan and resultantly 
signed on the Agreement of Accession on 27th March 1948. Thus, 
Balochistan became a province of the federation of Pakistan.  
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The Political Economy of Balochistan  
 The Baloch despite occupying a vast and resourceful territory has 
failed to keep the pace of socio-economic development and modernity with 
other fellow nations in the region. After the independence of Pakistan and 
the formation of Balochistan as a federating unit of the former, the Baloch 
because of her political disorganization and economic backwardness failed to 
exert herself within the federation to grab the resource share. The saga of 
economic and social backwardness of the Baloch and Balochistan is a 
complex conundrum. A section of the Baloch nationalists believe that the 
centralist nature of Pakistani federation is such that small nationalities like 
the Baloch would find it hard to accommodate within the federation. That is 
because the resource distribution and representation to both elected bodies 
and state institutions are based upon population, and Balochistan in spite of 
having 44% of Pakistan territory resides only 5% of country’s total 
population, thus the province is not proportionately represented within the 
federation. Moreover, the geostrategic importance of Balochistan is very 
vital that is hard to ignore while analyzing the political economy of the 
province. Therefore, the same nationalists section maintains that the 
federation is only interested to enjoy the geostrategic and economic 
potentials of the province. And the social and economic uplift of the Baloch 
is not the priority of the federation. 
 However, given the social structure of Balochistan a pertinent 
question may arise that how well-entrenched the modern concept of 
development would be in a society that coexists with primitive tribal system. 
Pakistan has not been a smooth democracy thus the electoral politics has 
failed to prevail the political economy of the country. Therefore, during 
controlled-democracy that intermitted the direct military rule or dictatorial 
regime the nature and style of the governance remained unaccommodating. 
The actual political and economic powers always cling on to the centrist 
forces and never devolved to the regional or provincial representatives. This 
led to the dysfunctional political process especially at provincial level that 
further consolidated the already stranglehold of local elites. Nevertheless, 
even if the power is given to the provincial-based leadership the social 
structure in Balochistan with strong tribal hierarchy may hinder the socio-
economic and political development of the people of Balochistan. Unlike 
other provinces of Pakistan where a teeming middle class has been emerging 
with assertive political and economic ambitions, the societal structure in 
Balochistan is sharply divided between a tiny but extremely powerful class 
of tribal chieftains and (il)legal business tycoons and remaining lower class 
and a small group of public sector employees. The vibrant middle class is 
missing in Baloch society that can have an assertive politics to further its 
social and economic interest. Hence, it is true that the federation has never 
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been interested to develop Balochistan and brought it fourth at par to other 
provinces.  But unfavourable social and economic system of Balochistan that 
entrusts and makes the local elites all powerful is equally responsible for 
impeding the process of development in Balochistan. In other words, one 
may argue that it is the power nexus of the state of Pakistan and the local 
elites and representatives that maneuver the governance in province in such a 
exploitative nature that only uphold and  nurture their political and economic 
interest at the very cost of common mass.  
  
Balochistan versus the Federation  
 The political relation of Balochistan has never been favourable with 
the federation and resultantly the former took the brunt of it in terms of 
insufficient resource provision from the latter and the inadequate 
representation in all federal institutions. But to analyse the underlying factors 
of this decades old odd relationship and its consequences, one needs to grasp 
the political economy of Balochistan.  
 This conjecture of politico-economic interest of Pakistani 
establishment in Balochistan can be best understood through David Harvey 
(2003) theory, what he considers the capitalist imperialism by a state. He 
goes on to explain that a major shift took place in mid 20th century when 
states initiated accumulating territory in which spatio-temporal fixes can be 
undertaken. Balochistan contains a vast land with highly strategic coastline 
and good endowment of natural resources is a viable target for Pakistan with 
spatio-temporal fixes interest. Looking at the military expansion in 
Balochistan it is not difficult to comprehend that Balochistan is not being 
treated as a unit of the federation by Pakistani state. Instead, the former is 
committed to treat the latter as her neoliberal colonialism. This territorial 
imperative can best be corroborated by the construction of military 
cantonments to the width and breadth of Balochistan, particularly at Gwadar, 
a highly strategic coastal town, Dera Bughti, district with the largest gas 
deposits in the country, and Kohlu, where it is believed that precious deposits 
of oil and gas reserves are untapped. In addition to this, the military’s 
commercialisation and resource grapping is evident from state’s direct 
involvement in coal business, gold and copper enterprises and real estate 
projects (Siddiqa, 2007). The territorial establishment of Pakistan military 
and civil bureaucracy is not without support of multinational corporations. 
Multinational capital, most importantly the Chinese companies, has 
expanded substantively in Balochistan  (later in current section we show that 
how multinational companies are involved in exploiting Balochistan’s 
natural resources). The deprivation along with discontent of the people of 
Balochistan against the state of Pakistan is increasing, as apparently they 
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perceive the military as a colonial force manifested in blatant self-
aggrandisement.                  
 The fact is Balochistan province is one of the poorest regions in the 
world and its inhabitants are among of the most deprived on earth. An 
average resident of Balochistan lives on less than a dollar a day, over 90% of 
the settlements in Balochistan have no access to clean potable drinking water 
or medical facilities and rural illiteracy exceeds 90%. Within Pakistan 
Balochistan’s per capita income is less than half of the country’s average 
meaning that an average a Baloch is likely to be twice as poor as his 
counterpart living in any of the other three provinces (Institute of Public 
Policy, 2011). It is unfortunate but true that even within the province of 
Balochistan; an average Baloch is twice as poor as an average Punjabi, 
Pashtun, or Hazara resident of the province. Even in the capital city of 
Balochistan, Quetta, less than one third of the households of the provincial 
metropolis are actually connected with the government water supply system 
and receive between 1-2 hours of water supply in 24 hours. The education 
system in the province is so inferior that those who can afford it would prefer 
to send their children to educational institutions outside the province; 
Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore or Peshawar. The same is true of medical 
facilities in the province; with a little affordability most people prefer to take 
their sick loved ones to Karachi or elsewhere for medical treatment. 
 In terms of economic structure, Balochistan is markedly different 
from the rest of Pakistan. While the rest of Pakistan is labour-abundant with 
redundant labour force, Balochistan barely with 5% population but with 
strong economic potentials can easily accommodate its indigenous labour 
force. While it is true that agriculture sector, like in the rest of Pakistan, 
continues to attract interest in Balochistan, its potential is circumscribed by 
the scarcity of water.38 That is because, unlike other provinces of Pakistan, 
the greater part of Balochistan is not connected to the Indus River System to 
irrigate its vast and fertile land. Moreover, Balochistan receives abundance 
rainfall water each year. If this water was managed properly through dams 
and constructed channels, the province would have sufficient water to 
irrigate its dry but fertile land.  
 
Lack of Infrastructure and Human Capital 
 A very basic ingredient of economic growth is the availability of 
physical and economic infrastructure. Such infrastructure in Balochistan is at 
worst non-existent and at best inadequate. As is the case with all extractive 
economies, roads and railways were built for purposes of extraction and 
                                                          
38 See the Balochistan Conservation Strategy and technical and background papers prepared 
for the Balochistan Resource Management Programme. 
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transportation of mineral and other resources (Bengali and Pasha, 2005). 
Grain and fruit farmers, animal raisers, and fishermen all remain poor partly 
because there is no farm to market roads and no local processing facilities are 
available within Balochistan. The British originally built the road system for 
their own colonial strategic purposes, not for the purpose of the economic 
development of Balochistan. Recent road system along the coastal areas may 
serve strategic purposes but their contribution to economic development of 
the province is minimal (Aasim, 2007). 
 No improvement in living standards and alleviation of poverty are 
possible without improvement in educational levels and standards. High rates 
of illiteracy and low standards of educational progress in Balochistan are the 
cause of many factors. These factors include: 1. Poverty, a typical poor 
person cannot afford to send his children to school, because that will mean 
loss of income that the child could make by helping parents in their 
subsistence activities; 2. due to poor educational standards parents realise that 
the children do not benefit from education and lose interest in family 
activities of farming, animal raising and fishing; 3. most people in 
Balochistan believe that the only reason that children should be sent to a 
school is for them to be able to get a government job. But they also realise 
that government jobs are for people who have connections with higher ups in 
the government or are rich to be able to pay bribes. So, why bother sending 
your children to school (Pakistan, various issues).  
 There is an established correlation between lower educational levels 
and higher rates of poverty. Studies performed in a number of Latin 
American, African and Asian countries have shown that a higher percentage 
of GDP spent on education, resulted in better educational levels and 
standards, which in turn resulted in higher economic growth rates and higher 
living standards (Winkler and Gershberg, 2000). The educational system in 
Balochistan is dysfunctional and a complete and absolute failure. 
Educational institutions are politicised, teacher appointments are made not 
on merit but on political grounds, and massive cheating takes place in all 
educational institutions and at all levels of education. 
 
Dearth of Economic Autonomy and Control over Resources  
 Besides agriculture and industry, the other potentials of economic 
growth of Balochistan come from mineral resources, transit routes and 
coastal development (ADB, 2004). The people of the province have no 
authority to run their own economic affairs and have no control over their 
natural resources. The Sui Gas case can be quoted as a classic illustration of 
economic exploitation of Balochistan. Natural gas was discovered on Sui site 
in the Dera Bughti District in Balochistan in the early 1950s and supplied to 
all provinces of Pakistan except Balochistan, where the same was supplied 
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about 30 years later. The gas company that exploits and controls the gas 
fields is a federal government controlled company and Balochistan gets 
minimum share of the revenues generated. A similar case scenario can be 
witnessed with all other minerals and natural resources discovered in 
Balochistan (WB, 2007). Another example of resource exploitation of 
Balochistan in the hand of Pakistani authorities with the collaboration of 
multinational firms is the Sandak Copper and Rek – e – Dik gold-copper 
projects respectively in Chagi District. In 2002, the federal government 
entered into an agreement with a Chinese company to handover the Sandak 
Project. Under the agreement the Chinese company would fetch 80% of total 
profits back home, pay 18% to the federal government of Pakistan and 
disburse only 2% to Balochistan government as royalty charges (Grae, 2006).  
Rek – e –Dik gold-copper is the second major project in Balochistan that was 
given to Antofagasta of Chile and Barrick Gold of Canada. This project was 
aimed to exploit an estimate of 20 million ounces of gold and two billion tons 
of copper from Balochistan.  
 The economies of colonies have always been extractive in nature. The 
natural resources of the colony are extracted, taken in raw form to the mother 
country/region, where they are processed into finished products. This brings 
poverty and absolute deprivation for the colonised people as even unskilled 
jobs that arise during the processing of the raw materials are not available to 
them. No efforts have been made to establish such industries in Balochistan 
that will process locally produced raw material into finished products. There 
is no economic justification for transporting coal to other provinces of 
Pakistan to use it directly as a source of energy or convert it into other 
sources of energy like electricity. This is particularly relevant because 
Balochistan faces acute shortages of energy and longest hours of blackouts. 
There is no economic justification for thousands of tons of raw marble stone, 
chromites, baryte, iron ore, shale, copper blister and other minerals to be 
taken in raw form to Karachi or to other places outside of the province for 
processing. Equally there is no economic justification for millions of tons of 
Balochistan fish to be taken to Karachi for processing and canning, because 
nowhere along the 750 kilometer Balochistan coast any fish processing 
facility exists. Also there is no economic justification to waste tons of 
Balochistan fruit and vegetables due to the absence of fruit processing 
industries in Balochistan (Zaidi, 2005). 
 Geographically the province occupies an important geo-strategic 
position in southwest and northwest Asia. It is on the cultural, social, 
economic and geographical crossroad of the Middle East, Central Asia and 
the South Asia, and opposite to Straits of Hormuz. These potentials could 
make the province an industrial hub with a massive private industrial 
investment, had it been utilised by adopting vigorous industrial policy.  
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According to a rough estimation, around 17 million barrels of crude oil 
passes through the Straits of Hormuz daily.  Sharing a 900 km border with 
Iran and 1200km with Afghanistan, the province “opens access to these 
mineral-rich and strategically important areas. It also marks an entry point 
into the resource-rich landlocked provinces of the Punjab and KP. Its 
geographical proximity to the oil and gas deposits of Central Asian regions 
adds to its strategic importance” (Gazdar, 2007: p. 8). The important 
strategic location places Balochistan on the cross road of a potential intra-
and inter-regional trade. Nonetheless, the gross ignorance of Pakistan 
towards the industrial development, Balochistan remains one of the least 
developed regions in the world in terms of all the human development 
indicators despite the abundance of the natural resource. 
 
Political Instability, Capital Formation and Industralisation  
 Investment and economic growth cannot take place in an environment 
of political instability. Due to the reasons mentioned above Balochistan 
remained unstable for the larger part of its history with Pakistan. Therefore, a 
favourable environment for capital investment in Balochistan has never been 
as lacking as in recent years. No domestic or foreign investor is willing to 
invest even in the provincial capital not to speak of the interior regions of 
Balochistan when there is no security and stability. In fact, in recent years, 
many investment opportunities have been lost and even running businesses 
have closed down such as Sariab Textile Mills and Harnai woolen Mills have 
already faded away that had provided employment opportunities to hundreds 
of people in Balochistan. Probably government policies and lack of security 
played a role in their shutting down. Hub industrial estate has not benefitted 
Balochistan much as far as providing employment opportunities to the people 
of Balochistan are concerned. In fact  Hub area industries are, for the most 
part, extension or subsidiaries of the Karachi based industries. The 
industrialists wanted to have tax relief by locating in Balochistan without 
providing employment opportunities to the people of Balochistan (Hasnain, 
2008). 
 Historically Balochistan with its tribal and semi-tribal social structure 
has had a strong politico-economic stranglehold by a chieftains and tribal 
sardars. Typical domination of tribal lords on the politics of the province 
marred the overall development and evolution of the political process that 
could lead to pave a way for the greater political participation of general 
masses. Therefore it will be plausible to argue that the current institutional 
structure is the construction of the political and economic supremacy of tiny 
elite. And such elitist political economy has created a rent-seeking oligarchy 
that has consolidated considerable economic and political power and drifted 
the provincial economy towards more exclusivity.  
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 There are important contrasts between Balochistan and the rest of 
Pakistan in terms of comparative advantage and potential sectors of 
economic growth. While the rest of Pakistan is a labour-abundant economy 
with potential growth modes in agriculture, manufacturing as well as labour-
intensive service sectors; Balochistan is relatively scarce in its endowments 
of human capital, agricultural growth and industrial investment. In the 
service sectors Balochistan’s growth potential appears to be closely 
connected to its integration with the national economy and other regional 
economies. Any growth strategy for Balochistan would need to take these 
differences as a point of departure.  
 
The Political Economy of Resource Sharing 
 In a federation like Pakistan the resource sharing takes place under 
the game theoretic bargaining principles. In the bargaining game among 
various stakeholders the weaker stakeholder(s) has less probability to gain 
optimal resources. This leads to create a situation where the interests and 
preferences of a dominant group and the weaker groups are more reflected in 
public policies [in fiscal policy making process the federal government has 
higher probability of gaining more resources from national budget. The 
inclination of public policy making towards powerful lobbies and influential 
province therefore would adversely affects the resource allocation to social 
sector, which inherently affects poor the most, and smaller provinces. The 
fiscal policy decisions not only determine allocations to social and economic 
services it equally affect resource distribution between federal and provincial 
governments.  
 Looking at Pakistan’s fiscal history one can easily notice that higher 
public expenditures, particularly the non-development expenditures, caused a 
burgeoning and unsustainable fiscal deficit. It mainly because the country is 
a typical example of Weingast et al. (1981) theory of “distributive conflicts”, 
where the geographical diversity and social and ethnic heterogeneity make 
the bringing of the public sector expenses to a manageable level a formidable 
task. During the budget making each geographical region and vested interest 
groups in the realm of the federation try to maximise the projects‟ allocation 
in the favour of their respective regions, ethnic groups and classes.  
 Structure of Pakistan‟s political economy partially resembles 
Lockwood (2002) model. The model explicitly discusses the domination of 
one province over other provinces of federation in terms of population. The 
dominant province, the Punjab, leverages its disproportionate legislative and 
administrative representations for project selection and fund allocation. 
Punjab with 58% of country‟s population enjoys a paramount dominance in 
public policy making. During democratic regimes the province remains the 
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favourable destination for projects selection due to its majority seats in the 
National Assembly. In the same way, during dictatorial regimes, the Punjab 
again has the lead in attracting disproportionately a bigger part of public 
resources since majority of military and civil bureaucracy personnel hail 
from the same province. Thus in a “non-cooperative” kind of a federation 
where one federating unit has more than half of the country‟s population 
excessive representation (even more than its population) in public 
institutions and geographical concentration inherently happens.  
 However, in order to avoid polarisation amongst the provinces, and 
for that reason to accommodate other provinces, the dominant province 
allows some projects to other provinces. It is worth noting that it is very 
unlikely for the smaller provinces to receive projects at the cost of dominant 
province. On the contrary, the projects allocated to the latter are in addition 
to what would already be given to the dominate province. This, therefore, 
leads to increase the size of the national budget and worsens the budget 
deficit. 
 
Low Productivity and Poor Living Standards 
 In any society prosperity and improved standards of living are 
achieved through improved productivity. Productivity is the output per unit of 
input. Labour productivity is determined by first calculating the value of the 
goods and services produced in a year’s time and then dividing it by either the 
total labour force or by the total number of hours of work spent in producing 
the goods and services.  In Thailand during 2013, for instance, the per capita 
income was $14,394 (World Bank, 2013).  That year in Thailand worker 
productivity [GDP (PPP) per hour worked] was 8.54. Whereas in the same 
year the per capita income in Pakistan was $ 4.602, and the worker 
productivity [GDP (PPP) per hour worked] was just 1.98, which is far lower 
than any of the medium income country.     
 Looking at the same statistics for Balochistan, the province performs 
far worse than the national average of Pakistan.  For instance, average yearly 
income per person in Balochistan is about $290 (Word Bank, 2013), and an 
average worker is, at the most, 1/59th as productive as a Thailand’s worker. 
This means that a worker in Balochistan (a shepherd, a fisherman, a farmer, 
daily wage labourer) produces goods and services equal to $1 or 95 rupees 
per hour.  
 The question is why productivity is so low in Balochistan. Three 
principal determinants of a nation’s labour productivity growth rate are: 1. the 
rate at which the economy builds up its stock of capital (machinery, 
equipment, buildings); 2.  the rate at which technology improves; and 3. the 
rate at which work force quality or human capital improves.  Worker 
productivity in Balochistan is low because a worker in Balochistan is 
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typically illiterate and uses minimal capital and primitive technology in the 
production process.   
 The social sector in Pakistan is weak and dysfunctional, which made 
Pakistan a classic example of ‘economic growth without development’ 
where a decent rate of economic growth has been achieved without adequate 
social sector development. Over the last 65 years, the country as whole has 
not been able to progress in all dimensions of social sector development, and 
particularly in the province of Balochistan that lags far behind other 
provinces in terms of all social sector indicators lags .The poor state of social 
sector has been largely due to the failure of the country to translate the fruits 
of economic growth for the improvement of the majority of the people. It is 
understandable that with such a weak social sector – with low level literary 
rate and poor and inadequate healthcare services, for instances – Balochistan 
province would not pass onto a better economic development path.  
 Pakistan seems to have failed to understand the fact that high and 
sustain economic growth depends on highly skilled, healthy and educated 
workforce, as suggested by new growth theories and exercised by many 
countries. For instance, the growth and development experience of countries, 
like Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, uncovers the striking fact that 
without social sector development economic growth is very unlikely to 
sustain itself. In comparison to these countries Pakistan lags far behind in 
almost all indicators of social and human development.  
Table 1: Comparison of HDI’s Trends of Selected Countries 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2013 
Pakistan 0.386 0.441 0.443 0.463 0 0.518 0.526 0.548 0.562 0.537 
India 0.428 0.456 0.494 0.517 0.561 0.576 0.585 0.6 0.609 0.586 
Morocco 0.471 0.497 0.516 0.56 0.582 0.626 0.631 0.638 0.646 0.617 
Indonesia 0.52 0.56 0.623 0.567 0.671 0.709 0.714 0.719 0.726 0.684 
Thailand 0.644 0.663 0.692 0.721 0.75 0.764 0.772 0.782 0.786 0.722 
Vietnam 0 0.559 0.595 0.645 0.688 0.703 0.709 0.714 0.718 0.638 
Egypt 0.843 0.539 0.572 0.628 0.665 0.704 0.709 0.712 0.716 0.682 
Source: Human Development Indices,  UNDP (2006; 2013)  
 
 Table 1 Indicates that Pakistan’s position in terms of the DHI is one 
of the lowest in comparison to countries with similar classification of per 
capita income by the World Bank.  For instance as latest as in 2013 the HDI 
in Pakistan was 0.537, which is the lowest in all seven included countries in 
the survey. 
 Among the social indicators, education and healthcare are considered 
to be very important for the overall development of society and are the key 
indicators on Human Development Index and Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).  
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 Pakistan progress on the MDGs shows that the country has adopted 
16 targets and 41 indicators against which progress towards achieving the 
Eight Goals of the MDG’s is measured. Time series data available for 33 of 
these indicators reveal that Pakistan is on track to achieve the targets on 9 
indicators, whereas its progress on 24 indicators is off track (UNDP, 2015). 
Table 2: GDP  at Constant  factor Cost, overall Pakistan and provinces 
Year Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Balochistan 
1999-00 26115 25420 57652 19368 27104 
20000-1 25442 24777 55469 19088 27499 
2001-02 25648 25260 54836 18907 28270 
2002-03 26266 25863 57036 18515 29104 
2003-04 27614 26919 61335 19112 31075 
2004-05 29436 28540 65801 21290 31224 
2005-06 30481 29820 67011 24210 26181 
2006-07 31869 31148 72374 23112 27807 
2007-08 32348 30859 75740 23802 29932 
2008-09 32221 31019 71261 25810 31693 
2009-10 32745 31333 74583 25968 29423 
2010-11 32848 31664 73326 26869 28503 
Source: SPDC (2012-13) and authors own calculation 
 
 As shown in the table 2, Balochistan although maintains a higher per 
capita GDP than KPK – because of its sparse population and vast resource 
base – however, it is important to notice that change in per capita GDP in 
Balochistan is far lower than other provinces. For instance, from 1999 to 
2010, the per capita GDP in Balochistan has shown a marginal increment 
from 27104 to 28503, whereas during the same period Punjab’s per capita 
GDP increased from  25420 to 31664 (see table 2). Hence, it may be 
plausible to argue that the economic growth of Balochistan remained almost 
stagnant, while all other provinces could maintain a medium growth rate. 
This therefore led to drift Balochistan from the social and economic trends of 
the country.  
 Looking at the provincial level, Balochistan is the worst performing 
province in most if not all areas of the MDGs. As available data shows,  at 
the current rate of progress, no MDG can be achieved in entirety in the 
province and in the aftermath of the floods, and the declining national 
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economic and security situation  in post 2007, even the achievements made 
so far in a few indicators or in a few districts are at risk of being undone. 
Balochistan’s performance while completely off track and below the national 
average for almost all indicators, is especially of grave concern in health and 
education related indicators. 43% of children are underweight in Balochistan 
against a target of 20%, reflecting a severe lag in performance. Similarly in 
MDG 2, in all three indicators; net primary enrolment ratio, 
completion/survival rate and literacy rate performance is lower than the 
national average and considerably behind the targets. Balochistan is also 
underperforming in 5 indicators of child mortality with a staggeringly high 
infant mortality rate by national standards. In MDG 5, progress is especially 
lagging for all indicators- at 785 deaths per hundred thousand live births; the 
maternal mortality ratio deserves immediate attention (UNDP, 2015). 
 
Lack of Democracy, Political Autonomy and Accountability 
 Democracy and accountability are important prerequisites for 
economic growth and prosperity. Although lack of democratic institutions 
and accountability are problems that exist throughout Pakistan, Balochistan is 
particularly afflicted with this scourge. People of Balochistan have never had 
the opportunity to fully participate in the process of decision making about 
how to run their own affairs. The interference of federal agencies in 
Balochistan’s elections and manipulate the electoral outcomes in the favour 
of certain political lobbies, rather than reflecting the wishes of the people of 
Balochistan. Moreover, the governor is also appointed by the federal 
government usually from outside of the province who is more loyal to the 
federal government rather than representing the people in Balochistan. The 
provincial governments installed in Balochistan were not necessarily those 
that are elected by the people of Balochistan, not those that are honest and 
sincere to work for the improvement of living conditions of the people of 
Balochistan, but those who are considered by the central government to be 
able to best serve the interests of the establishment in Balochistan. For 
example, the popularly elected governments in 1973 and 1997 were removed 
on suspicion that they were not loyal enough and or not obedient enough to 
the central government (Ahmed, 2004). The establishment of Pakistan wholly 
or partially controlled elections so that only those favoured by the 
‘establishment’ could form a government in Balochistan. If those in power in 
Balochistan are brought and maintained in power by sources other than the 
people of Balochistan, they will be accountable to those who brought them to 
power, not to the people of Balochistan. This situation also contributes to 
corruption by the provincial rulers and also contributes to further deprivation 
and poverty for the ordinary people of Balochistan (Ahmed, 1990, 2004, 
2010; Adeney, 2007a, 2007b). 
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Conclusion 
 Unlike other provinces and territories that constitute the federation of 
Pakistan, the province of Balochistan is entirely different.  Prior to the 
colonial rule on India, Balochistan was a loss confederacy of tribal chiefs 
and semi autonomous states (Harrison, 1981). After the British departure 
from Indian Subcontinent and the consequently formation of two 
independent states, India and Pakistan, Balochistan given its Muslim 
majority population became a part of Pakistan that in ensuing years gained 
the status of a province. This paper discussed that Balochistan has always 
been the poorest and least developed of all of Pakistan’s provinces. Since the 
mid-1970s its share of the country’s GDP has dropped from 4.9 to less than 
3% of national GDP in 2000 (Bengali and Pasha, 2005). The province has 
the highest infant and maternal mortality rate, the highest poverty rate, and 
the lowest literacy rate in Pakistan (Baloch, 2007). The government has often 
tries to co-opt Baloch with development projects, but none has achieved any 
measure of success. While economic development usually dominates the 
rhetoric coming from the federal government, the larger issue for the people 
of Balochistan has been the natural resource exploitation of the province. 
Despite being Pakistan’s most abundant province in natural gas, Balochistan 
has seen little benefit from it. The same resource is fully utilized in other 
major cities and towns of the country outside Balochistan, yet only a couple 
of cities in the province have access to natural gas.  This is because a new 
constitution introduced in 1973 set provincial gas royalties at 12.5%. 
However, the wellhead price of gas from each province was differentiated, 
based on per capita provincial income in 1953. This has resulted in a 
wellhead price five times lower than in Sindh and Punjab, meaning that 
Balochistan receives less in royalties. But more importantly this phenomenon 
points to an unpleasant relationship between Balochistan with the federation 
of Pakistan, which resultantly left a great deal of impact on the political 
economy of the latter.  
The paper highlighted that the political and economic relationship 
between Balochistan and the federation of Pakistan remained estranged 
because of certain historical facts. And this rugged state-province 
relationship caused Balochistan an acute shortage of resources, social and 
economic underdevelopment and perpetual domination of tribal chieftains on 
political landscape of the province. This somewhat unfavourable relationship 
costs Balochistan a heavy price chiefly in terms of social and economic 
backwardness and human misery.       
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